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PRO-CHOICE: ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
THROUGH THE PROSECUTOR’S  
PROPRIO MOTU POWER 
Jonathan Jeung–Meng Fork* 
Abstract: This Comment examines the proprio motu power of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court’s Prosecutor through the lens of a recent decision to 
permit the court’s Prosecutor to investigate potential crimes against hu-
manity in the Republic of Kenya. After a deeply contested election in 2007, 
violence exploded across the country leaving many civilians hurt or dead. 
The Prosecutor asked the court to permit him to open an investigation, a 
first in the ICC’s history, where most investigations are initiated through a 
request from either a State Party or the Security Council. While the use of 
the proprio motu initiative is deeply controversial, this Comment proposes 
that this prosecutorial power is essential in achieving the goals of the ICC: 
to end impunity for crimes against humanity. 
Introduction 
 On March 31, 2010, Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), the judicial body created by the United Nations 
General Assembly to try crimes of international concern,1 authorized 
its Prosecutor to proceed with an investigation into potential crimes 
against humanity in the Republic of Kenya.2 After a deeply contested 
election in 2007, violence exploded across the country—previously one 
of the most developed and stable nations in Africa—leaving more than 
1,100 people dead and hundreds displaced from their homes.3 The Ma-
jority found that the post-election violence fell within the jurisdictional 
                                                                                                                      
* Jonathan Jeung-Meng Fork is a Staff Writer for the Boston College International & 
Comparative Law Review. 
1 William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court 
15–18 (3d ed. 2007). 
2 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC–01/09, Decision Pursuant to Arti-
cle 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in 
the Republic of Kenya (Kenya Situation), ¶ 73 (Mar. 31, 2010). 
3 See Marlise Simons, Int’l Court Authorizes Inquiry of Kenyans Linked to 2007 Political 
Clashes, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 2010, at A12; Jeffrey Gettleman, Disputed Vote Plunges Kenya into 
Bloodshed, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 2007, at A1 [hereinafter Disputed]. 
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parameters of the ICC and permitted the Prosecutor to commence an 
investigation.4 Judge Hans-Peter Kaul’s dissent, however, differentiated 
between international crimes “of concern to the international commu-
nity,” which the ICC was formed to address,5 and common crimes 
“prosecuted by national criminal justice systems.”6 He argued that the 
post-election violence in Kenya did not rise to the level of an interna-
tional crime so as to trigger the jurisdiction of the court.7 The decision 
is notable because it is the first case in the ICC’s history where the 
Prosecutor has decided to investigate potential crimes on his own au-
thority, exercising his statutory proprio motu8 power, rather than investi-
gating situations referred to him through the United Nations Security 
Council or from other national governments.9 
 Part I of this Comment provides background information on the 
2007–2008 post-election violence in Kenya. Part II places the Prosecu-
tor’s proprio motu power into historical and procedural context, de-
scribes how the Majority and Dissent interpreted these powers, and fi-
nally summarizes how they analyzed the law to arrive at their differing 
conclusions. Part III focuses on the impact of this decision on the ICC 
and suggests that reading the statute broadly to grant the Prosecutor 
leeway to pursue proprio motu investigations advances the ICC’s mission 
to prosecute the gravest of international crimes. 
I. Background 
 The general election of 2007 has been described as “the greatest 
test yet of Kenya’s young, multiparty democracy,” and “the tightest race 
in the country’s history.”10 The incumbent, Mwai Kibaki, despite being 
praised as an economics expert, had long been criticized for favoring 
his own tribe, the Kikuyus, membership in which has traditionally been 
                                                                                                                      
4 See Kenya Situation, Case No. ICC–01/09, ¶ 73. 
5 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art.1, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 3, 37 I.L.M. 1002 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
6 Situation in the Republic of Kenya (Kenya Dissent), Case No. ICC–01/09, Dissenting 
Opinion of J. Hans-Peter Kaul ¶ 8 (Mar. 31, 2010). 
7 Id. ¶ 72. 
8 Ex proprio motu is a Latin phrase meaning “of one’s own accord.” Black’s Law Dic-
tionary 662 (9th ed. 2009). 
9 See Simons, supra note 3. 
10 Jeffrey Gettleman, Kenyans Vote in Closely Contested Presidential Election, N.Y. Times, 
Dec. 28, 2007, at A3 [hereinafter Kenyans Vote]. 
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indicative of belonging to Kenya’s social elite.11 Kibaki’s opponent, Rai-
la Odinga, a member of the Luo tribe, ran as a populist and cam-
paigned on behalf of the poor, promising to distribute Kenya’s growing 
prosperity more equitably.12 Early reports suggested that Odinga had 
gained a lead,13 but as the vote count progressed, splitting straight 
along tribal lines, his lead diminished rapidly amid cries of electoral 
misconduct and growing unrest in Nairobi’s vast shantytowns.14 Finally, 
despite accusations that it had ignored glaring irregularities, Kenya’s 
election commission declared Kibaki the winner, sparking ethnic vio-
lence in the capital that quickly spread to the rest of the country.15 
 While subsequent investigations into the causes and scope of the 
upheaval suggested that the violence was predominantly a spontaneous 
reaction to the election results, a United Nations report found that “the 
actual patterns of violence varied from one region to the next.”16 The 
U.N. investigators discerned three patterns of violence.17 The first, seen 
most obviously in the looting of houses and shops in the slums of Nai-
robi and Kisumu by various youth groups, seemed spontaneous to most 
observers.18 The investigators attributed this pattern of violence to the 
“cumulated frustrations generated by poor living conditions and his-
torical disenfranchisement” suffered by Odinga’s supporters and un-
leashed as a result of the alleged election fraud.19 The U.N. investiga-
tors identified a second pattern of violence where Odinga’s supporters 
targeted “communities of small farmers and land-holders perceived to 
be [Kibaki] supporters in the Rift Valley and aimed at driving and keep-
ing them away from the region.”20 The U.N. report claimed that “cred-
                                                                                                                      
11 Id.; Jeffrey Gettleman, Riots Batter Kenya as Rivals Declare Victory, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 
2007, at A3 [hereinafter Riots]; Jeffrey Gettleman, With Half of Vote Counted, Kenyan Opposi-
tion Is Poised to Sweep, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 2007, at A9 [hereinafter Vote Counted]. 
12 See Vote Counted, supra note 11. 
13 See id. 
14 Riots, supra note 11. 
15 See Disputed, supra note 3. 
16 U.N. High Comm’r for H.R., Report from OHCHR Fact-finding Mission to Kenya, 6–28 Feb-
ruary 2008, 3, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Press/OHCHRKenyareport.pdf (last vis-
ited Jan. 28, 2011) [hereinafter OHCHR Report]. The Prosecutor used the OHCHR Report as 
one of many human rights reports examining the post-election crisis in Kenya as support for 
his request to authorize an investigation into the situation in Kenya. See generally ICC Request 
for Authorization of an Investigation Pursuant to Article 15, Int’l Crim. Ct. (Nov. 11, 2009), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/90D5D0C1–0DEA-4428-BDB5–9CBCC7C9D590.htm (list-
ing the annexes the Prosecutor used for support). 
17 OHCHR Report, supra note 16, at 3. 
18 See id. 
19 Id. 
20 See id. 
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ible evidence” suggested that this violence was partially organized by 
local political or traditional leaders.21 The final pattern of violence, the 
investigators claimed, occurred later and was described as “retalia-
tory.”22 Reprisals targeting migrant workers, who were thought to be 
Odinga supporters, were reportedly carried out by Kibaki supporters 
and militia in a variety of regions.23 These alternative characterizations 
of the post-election violence—as either spontaneous or directed— 
could have divergent implications for the ICC’s jurisdiction.24 
II. Discussion 
A. The Prosecutor’s Proprio Motu Power 
 The Rome Statute created the Office of the Prosecutor to be an in-
dependent and “separate organ” of the court “responsible for receiving 
referrals and any substantiated information on crimes within the jurisdic-
tion of the [c]ourt.”25 The Office also examines these referrals, conducts 
investigations, and prosecutes cases before the ICC.26 It is headed by 
the Prosecutor—currently Argentinean Luis Moreno-Ocampo27—who is 
assisted by Deputy Prosecutors.28 Both the Prosecutor and his Deputies 
are elected secretly by an absolute majority of signatories to the Statute 
in an Assembly of States Parties, though Deputy Prosecutors are selected 
from a list submitted by the Prosecutor.29 Both officers serve for nine 
years, unless a shorter term is designated, and are not eligible for re-
election.30 
 Article 15 of the Rome Statute states that “[t]he Prosecutor may 
initiate investigations proprio motu on the basis of information on 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the [c]ourt.”31 This provision proved 
particularly controversial during the drafting process.32 Both supporters 
                                                                                                                      
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 See OHCHR Report, supra note 16, at 3. 
24 See Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 7(2)(a) (defining “attack directed against any ci-
vilian population” as one that must be “in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to 
commit such attack”). 
25 Id. art. 42(1). 
26 See id. 
27 Office of the Prosecutor, Int’l Crim. Ct., http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure 
+of+the+Court/Office+of+the+Prosecutor (last visited Jan. 28, 2011). 
28 See Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 42(2). 
29 Id. art. 42(4). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. art. 15(1). 
32 See Schabas, supra note 1, at 160–61. 
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and opponents of the idea of an independent Prosecutor “feared the 
risk of politicizing the [c]ourt and undermining its credibility.”33 Op-
ponents argued that the Prosecutor would target highly sensitive politi-
cal situations, or be beholden to powerful states or other groups that 
would attempt to use the ICC as a bargaining chip in political machina-
tions.34 Supporters claimed that confining the Prosecutor’s independ-
ence to “situations identified by overtly political institutions like states 
[or] the Security Council” would reduce the credibility of the entire 
court.35 The drafters therefore adopted a balanced approach that “ren-
dered the proprio motu power of the Prosecutor . . . acceptable.”36 
 Thus, after the Prosecutor determines that there is a “reasonable 
basis to proceed with an investigation,” he must submit a request to the 
Pre-Trial Chamber to authorize an investigation.37 The Chamber, after 
concluding that there is both “a reasonable basis to proceed with an 
investigation” and that “the case appears to fall within the jurisdiction 
of the court,” will authorize the investigation.38 In this way, there would 
be a measure of judicial oversight of the Prosecutor’s independence 
that would “prevent the Court from proceeding with unwarranted, fri-
volous or politically motivated investigations that could have a negative 
effect on its credibility.”39 
 Once an investigation is authorized, the Prosecutor has both duties 
and powers.40 He is required “to cover all facts and evidence relevant to 
an assessment of whether there is criminal responsibility . . . and, in do-
ing so, investigate incriminating and exonerating circumstances 
equally.”41 He is empowered to conduct investigations in the territory 
                                                                                                                      
33 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC–01/09, Decision Pursuant to Arti-
cle 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in 
the Republic of Kenya (Kenya Situation), ¶ 18 (Mar. 31, 2010); Allison Marston Danner, 
Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Crimi-
nal Court, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 510, 513–514 (2003) (arguing that the threat of a politicized 
Prosecutor is constrained by several methods of accountability and that transparent prose-
cutorial guidelines could enhance both the Prosecutor and Court’s legitimacy). 
34 See Danner, supra note 33, at 513. The United States took a particularly strong posi-
tion against an independent Prosecutor, claiming that groundless complaints would inun-
date the office and reduce its effectiveness. See id. at 514. 
35 See id. 
36 See Kenya Situation, Case No. ICC–01/09, ¶ 18. 
37 Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 15(3). 
38 See id. art. 15(4). 
39 See Situation in the Republic of Kenya (Kenya Dissent), Case No. ICC–01/09, Dissent-
ing Opinion of J. Hans-Peter Kaul ¶ 15 (Mar. 31, 2010). 
40 See Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 54; Schabas, supra note 1, at 248. 
41 Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 54(1)(a). Schabas argues that the wording suggests 
a Prosecutor with a high level of neutrality is more reminiscent of the “investigating magis-
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of a State Party after securing its cooperation,42 or without a State’s co-
operation after the Pre-Trial Chamber issues permission.43 Finally, the 
Prosecutor may collect and examine evidence; request the presence of 
or question people involved with the investigation; and seek the coop-
eration of any State or intergovernmental organization.44 Once an in-
vestigation is authorized, however, a full prosecution is not guaran-
teed.45 Cases are inadmissible when they are being investigated or 
prosecuted by a State that has jurisdiction over it, in which case, the 
Prosecutor must defer to that State’s investigation unless the Pre-Trial 
Chamber authorizes a continuation.46 
B. The Majority’s Analysis 
 At the outset, the Majority concluded that both the Chamber and 
the Prosecutor should use the same standard to determine whether an 
investigation is warranted.47 The Majority observed that the phrase 
“reasonable basis to proceed” appears in both the paragraph governing 
the Prosecutor’s conclusion that an investigation is appropriate and 
also in the paragraph governing the Chamber’s review of the Prosecu-
tor’s request.48 By tracing the various iterations of the Rome Statute, the 
Majority found support for its conclusion in the Statute’s travaux pré-
paratoires, or its legislative history, stating that “[h]ad the drafters in-
tended different standards, they could have used different wordings.”49 
 The Chamber also concluded that the “reasonable basis to pro-
ceed” test is the “lowest evidentiary standard [of the three evidentiary 
standards] provided for in the Statute.”50 Because the Statute does not 
define “reasonable basis to proceed,” the Majority determined that an 
                                                                                                                      
trate” of civil law systems rather than the adversarial prosecutorial attorneys of the com-
mon law. See Schabas, supra note 1, at 248. 
42 See Rome Statute, supra note 5, arts. 54(2)(a), 87. 
43 See id., arts. 54(2)(b), 57(3)(d). 
44 See id. art. 54(3). 
45 See id. art. 17. 
46 See id. art. 17(1). This is called “complementarity” by the Court. Kenya Situation, Case 
No. ICC–01/09, ¶ 53. 
47 Kenya Situation, Case No. ICC–01/09, ¶¶ 21, 22. 
48 See Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 15(3), (4); Kenya Situation, Case No. ICC–01/09, 
¶¶ 21, 22. 
49 See Kenya Situation, Case No. ICC–01/09, ¶ 22; Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 
8, at 1638. 
50 Kenya Situation, Case No. ICC–01/09, ¶¶ 27, 28 (citing three other evidentiary stan-
dards in ascending order of stringency: “reasonable grounds to believe”; “substantial grounds 
to believe”; and finally “beyond reasonable doubt”). 
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independent analysis of the phrase was appropriate.51 The court noted 
that the “standard should be construed and applied against the under-
lying purpose of the procedure in article 15(4) of the Statute, which is 
to prevent the [c]ourt from proceeding with unwarranted . . . investiga-
tions that could have a negative effect on its credibility.”52 Finally, the 
Majority concluded that, in evaluating the Prosecutor’s request, “the 
Chamber must be satisfied that there exists a sensible or reasonable 
justification for a belief that a crime falling within the jurisdiction of 
the court has been or is being committed.”53 However, the evidence the 
Prosecutor proffers as support for his request “need not point towards 
only one conclusion.”54 
 Having defined the “reasonable basis” standard, the Majority 
turned its attention to whether the post-election violence constituted a 
“crime within the jurisdiction of the [c]ourt.”55 For a crime to come 
within the court’s jurisdiction, it must fulfill the following conditions: it 
must fall within the category of crimes referred to in article 5 of the 
Statute and defined in articles 6, 7, or 9 ( jurisdiction ratione materiae, or 
subject-matter jurisdiction); it must fulfill the temporal requirements 
stated in article 11 ( jurisdiction ratione temporis, or whether the Statute 
was in force in the State at issue at the time of the alleged crime); and it 
must meet one of two alternative requirements embodied in article 
12—either jurisdiction ratione loci (whether the situation occurred in 
the territory of a State Party) or ratione personae (whether the accused is 
a national of a State Party).56 
 The Majority determined that the post-election violence in Kenya 
constituted a crime against humanity, falling within the subject-matter 
jurisdiction of the Court, and therefore there was a “reasonable basis” 
to proceed with the investigation.57 The Statute defines crimes against 
humanity as any of the following acts committed as “part of a wide-
spread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population:” 
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or forcible transfer 
of population, imprisonment, torture, rape, persecution, enforced dis-
appearance, apartheid, and “other inhumane acts of similar character 
                                                                                                                      
51 See id. ¶ 29. 
52 See id. ¶ 32. 
53 See id. ¶¶ 34, 35 
54 See id. ¶ 34. 
55 See id. ¶ 36. 
56 See Kenya Situation, Case No. ICC–01/09, ¶¶ 38, 39. 
57 Id. ¶ 73. 
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intentionally causing great suffering.”58 Moreover, these acts must be in 
“furtherance of a State or organizational policy.”59 In interpreting this 
element, the Chamber looked at other international criminal tribunals, 
and concluded that organizations not linked to a State could commit a 
crime against humanity and that such crimes need not have been con-
ceived at the highest levels of government.60 After examining the avail-
able information, “bearing in mind the nature of the present proceed-
ings” and the “low threshold,” the Chamber concluded that crimes 
against humanity may have been committed, thus fulfilling the subject-
matter jurisdiction requirement of the Statute.61 Because Kenya is a 
State Party, and because the alleged crimes took place after the Statute 
came into force in Kenya’s territory, jurisdiction ratione temporis and ju-
risdiction ratione loci were both also fulfilled and the Prosecutor’s re-
quest was granted.62 
C. The Dissent’s Analysis 
 While condemning the violence, Judge Hans-Peter Kaul, writing for 
the Dissent, nonetheless opined that the ICC was not the right forum to 
try any potential crimes against humanity that allegedly occurred in 
Kenya.63 He argued that there are two categories of international 
crimes:64 “international crimes of concern to the international commu-
nity as a whole,” particularly genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes for which the ICC is the appropriate forum;65 as well as common 
crimes, which, though serious, should be prosecuted by national crimi-
nal justice systems.66 He emphasized that there exists a bright line be-
tween those two categories of crimes that should not be crossed without 
great thought because doing so might infringe on state sovereignty and 
turn the ICC, “which is fully dependent on State cooperation,” into an 
institution that is “hopelessly overstretched” and inefficient.67 
                                                                                                                      
58 See Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 7(1). 
59 Id. art. 7(2)(a). 
60 Kenya Situation, Case No. ICC–01/09, ¶¶ 89, 90, 91, 92. 
61 Id. ¶ 73. 
62 See id. ¶¶ 178, 179 (stating that because jurisdiction ratione loci had been fulfilled, 
the alternative basis to exercise jurisdiction—jurisdiction ratione personae—need not be 
examined). 
63 See Kenya Dissent, Case No. ICC–01/09, ¶ 6. 
64 Id. ¶ 8. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 See id. ¶¶ 9, 10. 
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 In addition, while the “reasonable basis to proceed” standard is 
low,68 Judge Kaul cautioned that the Statute nevertheless requires a 
“full, genuine, and substantive determination of the Chamber.”69 He 
argued that the procedural purpose of the Chamber’s review was to 
protect the court’s credibility, and that the Chamber must ensure that 
the court has jurisdiction over alleged crimes throughout the entire 
proceedings by refraining from satisfying the standard with “any infor-
mation, of even fragmentary nature.”70 Thus, Judge Kaul suggested that 
the “reasonable basis” standard is not as low as the Majority argued, 
that is, the evidence need not point to only one conclusion at this stage, 
but should instead reasonably point to a conclusion that an exercise of 
the court’s jurisdiction is warranted.71 Finally, the Chamber is duty-
bound to apply the standard equally and consistently to “all require-
ments falling under article 15,” and “in particular in relation to the ra-
tione materiae jurisdiction of the [c]ourt.”72 
 Judge Kaul concluded that the post-election violence in Kenya was 
not a crime against humanity as defined in the Statute, and therefore 
did not fall under the subject matter jurisdiction of the court.73 He ar-
gued that the “contextual elements of crimes against humanity” [were] 
inadequately explored.74 While article 7 can be used to define “attack” 
broadly,75 the contextual element enumerated in article 7(2)(a) calls for 
the attack to be in furtherance of a “State or organizational policy.”76 He 
argued that only the higher levels of government can establish a State 
policy.77 As for “organization,” Judge Kaul examined other translations 
of the Statute and noted that the English version is phrased more gen-
erously than other authentic versions.78 The Statute, in other languages, 
requires that in order for the attack to fall under the ICC’s jurisdictional 
                                                                                                                      
68 Id. ¶ 14. 
69 See Kenya Dissent, Case No. ICC–01/09, ¶ 14. 
70 Id. ¶ 15. 
71 See id. ¶ 18 (“I believe the Prosecutor must demonstrate his determination . . . and 
substantiate it with adequate material leading the Chamber to conclude that an authoriza-
tion . . . is warranted.”). 
72 Id. ¶ 17. 
73 Id. ¶ 4. 
74 Id. ¶ 18. 
75 See Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 7(1)(k) (defining an attack as “other inhumane 
acts . . . causing great suffering or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health”). 
76 Id. art. 7(2)(a); Kenya Dissent, Case No. ICC–01/09, ¶ 26. 
77 See Kenya Dissent, Case No. ICC–01/09, ¶ 43. 
78 See id. ¶¶ 37, 38 (quoting the French version as “la politique d’un Etat ou d’une or-
ganisation,” and the Spanish as “de conformidad con la política de un Estado o de una 
organización,” while the English says “pursuant or in furtherance of a State or organiza-
tional policy”). 
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ambit, it must be authored by an entity like that of an organization, 
while the English version would accept “the meaning of a policy to be of 
a systematic nature but does not necessarily need [it] to be authored by 
an entity like that of an organization.”79 Read contextually and histori-
cally, moreover, Judge Kaul argued that the “organization” should have 
some characteristics of a State, and that entities such as “a mob” or a 
“[group] of armed civilians” do not reach the prescribed level to fulfill 
this requirement.80 Thus, taking a more restrictive reading of the Stat-
ute,81 Judge Kaul concluded that the violence in Kenya was not commit-
ted “pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy,” 
and therefore did not fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC.82 
III. Analysis 
 By giving broad effect to the Prosecutor’s proprio motu power, the 
Majority enhanced the effectiveness of the Court in prosecuting the 
terrible crimes it was created to fight.83 For most of the Twenty-first 
Century, political authorities selected the situations to be prosecuted, 
while prosecutors could only select specific cases within those situations 
to try.84 Prosecutors had no power to refuse to investigate the situation, 
nor could they decide to investigate beyond the jurisdiction given to 
them.85 Political solutions to massive atrocities often resulted in impu-
nity for the worst perpetrators.86 For example, when Japan signed its 
final peace treaty with the Allies in San Francisco in 1951, it demanded 
that all Japanese prisoners held for war crimes be transferred to a cen-
tral prison in Tokyo.87 Indeed, Japan never recognized the legitimacy of 
                                                                                                                      
79 Id. 
80 Id. ¶¶ 51, 52. 
81 See id. ¶ 56. 
82 See id. ¶ 82 (“Local politicians, civic candidates or aspirants, councilors and business 
people meeting and allegedly financing the violence do not form an ‘organization’ . . . . 
Meetings during the time concerned point to ad hoc preparations . . . .”). 
83 See Elizabeth C. Minogue, Comment, Increasing the Effectiveness of the Security Council’s 
Chapter VII Authority in the Current Situations Before the International Criminal Court, 61 Vand. 
L. Rev. 647, 649 (2008) (arguing that in order for the ICC to act effectively, it must be able 
to carry out investigations and prosecute the accused). 
84 See Luis Moreno-Ocampo, The International Criminal Court: Seeking Global Justice, 40 
Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 215, 219 (2007–08). 
85 Id. 
86 See id. at 219–20 (citing Idi Amin Dada and Baby Doc Duvalier as examples of politi-
cal leaders who committed crimes against humanity, but were pushed into “golden exile,” 
rather than punished, as a result of political negotiations). 
87 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The International Criminal Court in Historical Context, 1999 St. 
Louis-Warsaw Transatlantic L. J. 55, 62 (1999). 
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its Post-World War II criminal tribunals, and by 1954, one of those con-
victed at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial became Prime Minister and an-
other became Minister of Foreign Affairs.88 The innovation of the 
Rome Statute’s grant of proprio motu power to the Prosecutor, therefore, 
was to ensure that justice could prevail over any political decision by 
introducing an independent judicial actor to monitor, and prosecute 
horrendous international crimes.89 
 By setting the “reasonable basis to proceed” standard as low as it 
did, the Majority created the possibility for active, independent Prosecu-
tors to use the office as a means to ensure that perpetrators of interna-
tional crimes cannot escape with impunity.90 At the outset, merely know-
ing that a vigilant Prosecutor exists might deter those crimes from 
happening in the first place because, if such a crime were to occur, the 
Pre-Trial Chamber would likely authorize an investigation at the Prose-
cutor’s request.91 For this purpose, the Office of the Prosecutor created 
a Jurisdiction, Complementarity and Cooperation Division to assess all 
communications received regarding crimes, to examine documents de-
scribing such crimes, and to advise the Prosecutor on which crimes to 
investigate.92 Secondly, if a crime were to be committed, the threat of 
independent ICC investigation or ICC assistance would encourage na-
tional judicial systems to undertake investigations themselves.93 Finally, 
when a state is unable or unwilling to investigate alleged crimes that are 
within the court’s jurisdiction, a low “reasonable basis to proceed” stan-
dard would allow the Prosecutor to gather more information about the 
situation, which in turn would allow the Prosecutor to assess whether a 
full prosecution is warranted.94 If a prosecution is appropriate, the court 
                                                                                                                      
88 Id. 
89 See Moreno-Ocampo, supra note 84, at 220. But see Alexander K.A. Greenwalt, Justice 
Without Politics? Prosecutorial Discretion and the International Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U. J. Int’l 
L. & Pol. 583, 633, 660 (2007) (arguing that the Prosecutor cannot make charging deci-
sions without undertaking “complex political calculations” that the ICC was designed to 
avoid, particularly in post-conflict situations where the state at issue is attempting transi-
tional justice, and that the Prosecutor should yield to political actors with equal legitimacy 
in those cases). 
90 See Moreno-Ocamp, supra note 84, at 220. 
91 See Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 15; Moreno-Ocamp, supra note 84, at 220. 
92 See Moreno-Ocampo, supra note 84, at 220; Office of the Prosecutor, supra note 27. 
93 See William W. Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court 
and National Courts in the Rome System of International Justice, 49 Harv. Int’l L.J. 53, 54 
(2008) (calling for the ICC to adopt “proactive complementarity,” a policy in which the 
ICC would cooperate with national governments while using political leverage to encour-
age states to undertake their own prosecutions). 
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will therefore be in a better position to issue an arrest warrant, and per-
petrators of the worst international crimes would be called to account.95 
Thus, the court would be able to achieve its goals more effectively.96 
 The benefits of having a low “reasonable basis to proceed” stan-
dard would therefore outweigh any threats to the court’s credibility be-
cause there are judicial, political, and procedural controls on the Pros-
ecutor to curtail him should he abuse his proprio motu initiative.97 The 
fact that the Pre-Trial Chamber must approve an investigation initiated 
via the Prosecutor’s proprio motu power provides a measure of judicial 
oversight and would deter flagrant abuses of prosecutorial discretion.98 
Moreover, the Prosecutor is politically accountable to the Assembly of 
States Parties, who elects him, and may remove him for cause.99 More 
subtly, States themselves exercise implicit political control by refusing to 
cooperate with the ICC or its Prosecutor.100 Procedurally, even though 
the Majority read the Statute and the “reasonable basis to proceed” 
standard broadly, the standard is not without substance.101 The Prose-
cutor is still bound to gather information and analyze “the seriousness 
of the information received” before requesting an investigation.102 
Thus, any threats to the court’s credibility should be ameliorated by 
these checks on the Prosecutor.103 
Conclusion 
 In allowing the Prosecutor to proceed with his proprio motu investi-
gation in Kenya’s post-election violence, the ICC read the “reasonable 
basis to proceed” standard broadly. Despite the Dissent’s objection, do-
ing so is salutary because it permits the Prosecutor to pursue the goals 
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Prosecutor lies in the Court’s powers relating to international cooperation and judicial 
assistance.”). 
101 See Kenya Situation, Case No. ICC–01/09, ¶ 35. 
102 Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 15. 
103 See id.; Kenya Situation, Case No. ICC–01/09, ¶ 35; Danner, supra note 33, at 527. 
2011 The ICC and Prosecutors’ Proprio Motu Powers 65 
of the court more effectively. Formal and informal checks on the 
Prosecutor serve as an appropriate restraint on any abuse of the Prose-
cutor’s proprio motu initiative. While there are still many challenges for 
the court remaining, crippling the Prosecutor at this early stage of the 
court’s development would only permit perpetrators of the worst kinds 
of international crimes to escape accountability. 
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